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ABSTRACT 
  This paper examines why some transitions are more successful than others by focusing 
attention on the role of productive, protective and predatory behaviors from the perspective of 
the new institutional economics. Many transition economies are characterized by a fundamental 
inconsistency between formal and informal institutions. When formal and informal rules clash, 
noncompliant behaviors proliferate, among them, tax evasion, corruption, bribery, organized 
criminality, and theft of government property. These wealth redistributing protective and 
predatory behaviors activities absorb resources that could otherwise be used for wealth 
production resulting in huge transition costs. 
  Noncompliant behaviors--evasion, avoidance, circumvention, abuse, and/or corruption of 
institutional rules--comprise what we can be termed underground economies.  A variety of 
underground economies can be differentiated according to the types of rules violated by the 
noncompliant behaviors. The focus of the new institutional economics is on the consequences of 
institutions--the rules that structure and constrain economic activity--for economic outcomes.  
Underground economics is concerned with instances in which the rules are evaded, 
circumvented, and violated.  It seeks to determine the conditions likely to foster rule violations, 
and to understand the various consequences of noncompliance with institutional rules. 
Noncompliance with ‘bad” rules may actually foster development whereas non compliance with 
“good” rules will hinder development.  Since rules differ, both the nature and consequences of 
rule violations will therefore depend on the particular rules violated.  Institutional economics and 
underground economics are therefore highly complementary.  The former examines the rules of 
the game, the latter the strategic responses of individuals and organizations to those rules.   
Economic performance depends on both the nature of the rules and the extent of compliance with 
them. 
  Institutions therefore do affect economic performance, but it is not always obvious which 
institutional rules dominate.  Where formal and informal institutions are coherent and consistent, 
the incentives produced by the formal rules will affect economic outcomes.  Under these 
circumstances, the rule of law typically secures property rights, reduces uncertainty, and lowers 
transaction costs.   In regimes of discretionary authority where formal institutions conflict with 
informal norms, noncompliance with the formal rules becomes pervasive, and underground 
economic activity is consequential for economic outcomes.  
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  “The more corrupt the state, the more numerous the laws.”  
     Tacitus  History,  III  c.  100 
 
  “Laws like cobwebs, entangle the weak, but are broken by the strong.” 




INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  
 
 
   North (1990) has persuasively argued that institutions matter insofar as they affect 
economic outcomes, but we still lack an explicit formulation of the critical relationship between 
institutional arrangements and economic performance.  From the perspective of economic 
history, the institutional change that shapes the evolution of societies is seen as “overwhelmingly 
incremental” and highly “path dependent.”  How then, are we to reconcile this “glacial” view of 
institutional change with the radical transformations now under way in Central and Eastern 
Europe and in the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union?  Are these 
revolutions less revolutionary and less discontinuous than they appear?   What will ultimately 
determine their outcomes?  North (1990: 91) suggests that the outcomes of revolutionary 
changes will depend on “the ongoing tension between informal constraints and the new formal 
rules.”  Formal institutions have indeed changed radically in the former Soviet Union, but 
informal institutions much less so. What then can we learn from a closer examination of the 
informal conventions, particularly when these include norms of noncompliance with the formal 
rules? 
                                                           
* Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison –(elfeige@wisc.edu)   This paper attempts to identify some of the critical components of the institutional matrix 
that motivates behavior, the types of behaviors most likely to affect economic performance, and 
the complexity of the relationship linking the two.  They provide us with valuable hints as to 
where we must look to discover just how institutions determine economic performance.  
  The historical laboratory of the transition economies has revealed that liberalization, 
stabilization, and privatization may be necessary but are by no means sufficient conditions for 
creating “market economies.”  Every market presupposes the existence of property rights to be 
traded.  When these rights are established, supported, and enforced in a transparent, even-handed 
manner under the rule of law, the transaction costs of exchange are significantly reduced, and 
economic outcomes are likely to be improved.  Many of the transition economies have yet to 
establish the rule of law, and suffer instead from the legacy of regimes of arbitrary discretion that 
encouraged noncompliant behavior as the informal norm.  
  If we are to understand why some transitions have been relatively rapid and successful 
while others have languished and suffered from huge adjustment costs, we must examine how 
each society has structured the relative incentives for productive, protective, and predatory 
behaviors.  These incentive structures are unlikely to be transparent, particularly when there is a 
lack of coherence between formal and informal institutions.  When formal and informal 
institutions clash, noncompliant behaviors proliferate, among them, tax evasion, corruption, 
bribery, organized criminality, and theft of government property. 
  Many of the centrally planned economies suffered from fundamental inconsistencies 
between formal and informal institutions.  Consequentially, the transition process had to deal 
with a legacy of noncompliant behaviors involving protective and predatory activities.  One of 
the great challenges for a successful transformation is determining how to restructure institutions 
and incentives so that resources are redirected toward productive outcomes.  
 
PRODUCTION, PROTECTION, AND PREDATION   Societies allocate scarce resources to produce, protect, and redistribute wealth.  A 
nation’s growth--its ability to produce new wealth--will be determined by its technology, the 
quality and quantity of its total resource endowment, and the amounts of resources employed in 
the protection and redistribution of existing wealth.  Those resources not devoted to protective 
and acquisitive activities can be allocated to the production of new wealth. 
   As the administrative mechanisms of central planning give way to market allocations, 
and state ownership is replaced by private property rights, economic behavior is guided by a 
radically altered system of incentives, sanctions, and opportunities.  Given these new 
institutional rules, individuals and organizations must make strategic decisions about the 
allocation of their scarce resources among productive, protective, and predatory activities.  We 
might conjecture that the most constructive form of institutional change is that which provides 
incentives to direct resources away from protective and acquisitive activities and toward 
productive ones. 
   Production costs reflect the transformation of inputs into outputs.  Transactions costs are 
associated with the acquisition, protection, and transfer of property rights.  The linkage between 
institutions and economic performance depends critically on the incentive structures that flow 
from property rights.  Efficient institutions provide incentives to minimize the sum of production 
and transaction costs.  When property rights are uncertain and insecure, difficult to measure and 
monitor, costly to enforce, and inconvenient to trade, transaction costs are high, and considerable 
resources must be employed for the protection and redistribution of wealth.  Conversely, when 
institutions are successful at reducing these transaction costs, resources are freed to enhance 
economic performance.   
  Institutions generate and enforce rules of behavior and rules of procedure.  Rules of 
behavior structure incentives and constraints on permissible activities; rules of procedure specify 
acceptable means for amending and modifying the existing rules.  Institutional change can occur 
in either a prescribed or a proscribed manner.  Prescribed institutional change is in accordance 
with a society’s rules of procedure, whereas proscribed institutional change comes about when behavioral and procedural rules are broadly violated.  Noncompliance with formal rules changes 
institutions.  Prescribed change is typically smooth and gradual, whereas proscribed change, 
resulting from noncompliance with existing rules, typically appears to be traumatic and radical.  
  Underground economies are characterized by noncompliant economic behaviors 
involving evasion, avoidance, circumvention, abuse, and/or corruption of the rules, as well as 
accompanying efforts to conceal these illicit behaviors from the view of public authorities. 
Noncompliance is responsible for many of the unintended consequences that often result from 
policy reforms.  The effort to conceal underground activity systematically distorts conventional 
information systems and thereby complicates efforts to observe and monitor the consequences of 
policy reforms.  These consequences and the way they are perceived thus depend in large 
measure on the extent to which individuals and organizations comply with the new rules.  The 
choice to comply or not depends on the relevant incentives and sanctions and is often 
conditioned by the institutional structure that prevailed in the pre-transition period.  Therefore, 
institutional change is likely to be path dependent.     
  When rules are circumvented by widespread noncompliance, economic performance is 
likely to be powerfully affected.  Since institutional change is the defining feature of transition 
economies, any inquiry into the causes and ultimate consequences of the transition must include 
an analysis of the incentives and sanctions governing various types of underground economic 
activities.  Indeed, the perception, nature, and consequences of noncompliant behaviors depend 
on the particular rules being violated.  Any analysis of institutional change in the context of 
transitional economies must address the consequences of noncompliant behavior as manifest in 
different underground economies.  These include the widely observed occurrences of bribery, 
corruption, organized crime, financial scams, tax evasion, property theft, smuggling, money 
laundering, and extortion. 
 
Formal and Informal Institutions   Institutions represent the rules that constrain human behaviors by affecting the expected 
payoffs for economic actors.  But there are many types of institutions, spanning formal legal 
systems and informal customs and norms.  Particularly in times of social transformation, the 
rules of different institutions may be discordant.  Eggertsson (1997) points out that “the primary 
weakness of the economics of institutions is its limited understanding of the amalgam of formal 
and informal rules and their attendant enforcement mechanisms.”  
  When the institutional amalgam is hierarchical, consistent, and complementary, we most 
easily discern effective rules by studying their codification in formal institutions. Coherence 
between formal and informal norms simplifies the task of defining and enforcing acceptable 
behavior.  Compliance with the existing institutional rules is the dominant behavior. 
  When formal and informal rules are inconsistent or in conflict, the effective rules 
germane to economic performance will depend on the extent to which individuals and 
organizations comply with the formal rules.  Observation of widespread noncompliant behavior 
signals a formal system in distress.  The study of noncompliant behaviors (underground 
activities) and the incentive structures that induce these behaviors provides a powerful diagnostic 
tool for identifying which informal institutions effectively motivate relevant economic outcomes.  
Leitzel (1997) points out that “while evasive behavior complicates the effort to analyze the 
impact of policies, it can promote reform” by attracting the attention of policy makers, who can 
then either increase enforcement or legitimate the noncompliant behavior through liberalization 
of the rules. 
 
Noncompliant Behaviors 
  Changing incentive structures affect the relative costs and benefits of complying with a 
newly evolving system of rules.  Noncompliant behaviors--evasion, avoidance, circumvention, 
abuse, and/or corruption of institutional rules--comprise what we can be termed underground 
economies.  A variety of underground economies can be differentiated according to the types of 
rules violated by the noncompliant behaviors.     Noncompliant behaviors are often the source of the unintended consequences observed in 
the aftermath of policy reforms.  Moreover, since such behaviors are subject to penalties, rule 
violators will attempt to conceal them from public view.  Successful concealment distorts 
information and hinders our ability to perceive and interpret correctly the outcomes of policy 
reforms. 
   Radical institutional reform often creates a climate rife with noncompliant behaviors.  
The extent, nature, and consequences of underground economic activity will affect the impact of 
institutional change on economic outcomes.  The study of noncompliance in transition 
economies is likely to yield the most revealing view of the effective prevailing incentive 
structure, of the critical strategic behaviors induced by that structure, and thus of the outcomes of 
policy changes.  
 
Institutional Economics and Underground Economics 
  The focus of the new institutional economics is on the consequences of institutions--the 
rules that structure and constrain economic activity--for economic outcomes.  Underground 
economics is concerned with instances in which the rules are evaded, circumvented, and 
violated.  It seeks to determine the conditions likely to foster rule violations, and to understand 
the various consequences of noncompliance with institutional rules.  The greater the expected net 
benefit from noncompliance, the higher its expected incidence.  Since rules differ, both the 
nature and consequences of rule violations will depend on the particular rules violated.  
Institutional economics and underground economics are therefore highly complementary.  The 
former examines the rules of the game, the latter the strategic responses of individuals and 
organizations to those rules.  Economic performance depends on both the nature of the rules and 
the extent of compliance with them. 
   There are, of course, as many noncompliant activities as there are rules to be violated. 
Feige (1990a) has shown that underground economies comprise similar types of noncompliant 
behaviors.  For example, when fiscal rules are violated, tax evasion and benefit fraud behaviors are said to comprise the unreported economy.   As suggested earlier, rule violators, mindful of 
penalties, will typically seek to conceal their behavior from public authorities.  When income-
producing activities are concealed and thus cannot be appropriately included in national income 
accounts, accounting conventions are violated, creating an unrecorded economy.  Those 
activities involving the abuse of public office for private gain constitute the corruption economy.  
More generally, those activities that violate the rules prohibiting extortion, financial fraud, 
smuggling, organized crime, and theft of state property are examples of illegal economy 
activities.  
  
Consequences of Noncompliance 
  There is a growing literature expressing concern about the prevalence of illegal activities 
and their corrosive effects.  However, Leitzel (1997) reminds us that, as noted above, the 
consequences of various noncompliant behaviors depend critically on the nature of the rules 
being violated.  The violation of “bad” rules--“those that prohibit voluntary exchanges--in the 
absence of negative third party effects”-- may actually have positive economic consequences.1  
De Soto (1989) argues that noncompliant behaviors that circumvent onerous regulations in 
developing countries effectively reduce transaction costs and therefore should be encouraged and 
legitimated.  Corruption can also be viewed as a means of circumventing bureaucratic obstacles 
with "speed money," and even organized crime has been cited as a means of providing 
enforcement of property rights when the state is weak and ineffectual.  
   The evasion, circumvention, and violation of “good” rules--those that prohibit and 
regulate coercive behaviors-- are likely to make society worse off.  In the parlance of 
institutional analysis, whenever noncompliance increases uncertainty and the costs of measuring 
and monitoring behavior, it raises transaction costs and is likely to have damaging social 
consequences.  Indeed, the weight of the evidence appears to be shifting in the direction of 
                                                           
1 Similar arguments can be found in Leff (1966) and Huntington (1968). uncovering the long-term damage that result from pervasive noncompliance, particularly in the 
form of corruption and organized crime.  Bribery and corruption often encourage the 
bureaucracy simply to create additional artificial administrative hurdles in order to receive side 
payments for their removal.  At the same time, organized crime and corruption are seen as a 
growing menace to new business establishments and as a major barrier discouraging foreign 
capital investments.   
   The extent of noncompliance is also an important factor when threshold effects dominate 
the dynamics of institutional change.  Low levels of noncompliance with bad rules might provide 
a useful buffer against the negative effects of the bad rules, but widespread noncompliance can 
undermine the social fabric and erode political legitimacy, thereby jeopardizing the fundamental 
principle of the rule of law. 
  There is now an ongoing debate (see Grossman, 1989; De Soto, 1989; Klitgaard, 1991; 
Leitzel et al., 1995; Trang, 1994; Alexeev, 1997; Lotspeich, 1995; Shelley, 1995; Tanzi, 1994; 
Anderson, 1995; and Mauro, 1995) concerning the consequences of various types of 
noncompliant behaviors.  Analysis of noncompliance under the Soviet regime suggests that the 
circumvention of price and production controls contributed to a more efficient system and served 
to buffer some of the most costly consequences of allocation by administrative control.  The 
buffer function may have extended the lifetime of the Soviet regime by ameliorating some of the 
costs of misallocation.  But, as discussed below, the pervasiveness of noncompliance under the 
Soviet regime has had a pernicious effect on subsequent economic reforms. 
 
The Legacy of Noncompliance 
  If we are to understand the severe adjustment costs sustained during the transition 
process, particularly in the NIS, we must examine the institutional structure of the earlier Soviet 
regime and the legacy of noncompliant “second-economy” behaviors induced by its perverse 
incentive systems (Grossman, 1977).   The Soviet Union’s criminal code prohibited most of the 
private economic activities regarded as normal in Western market economies.  Despite heavy penalties, however, noncompliance with the formal laws was the rule rather than the exception.  
Handleman (1995:275) describes the Soviet Union as the “world’s most heavily policed state.”  
Yet paradoxically, it functioned as an essentially lawless society.  
  Grossman (1992:220) has pointed out that if one were to attempt to characterize the 
conditions likely to “maximize the scope and size of a country’s underground economy,” one 
would effectively describe Soviet-type socialism.  A shortage economy with state-controlled 
prices well below black market prices created significant incentives for internal arbitrage and 
speculation.  Similar gaps between world prices of tradables and controlled domestic prices 
encouraged international smuggling.  The prevalence of amorphous property rights and lax 
controls over state assets made the theft of state assets a pervasive predatory activity.  Low 
administrative salaries combined with powerful governmental authority created rent-generating 
opportunities for bribery and corruption to flourish.  In short, the economic incentives to engage 
in economic crimes were substantial, but so were the penalties. 
    Feldbrugge (1989) describes how the formal legal system treated economic crimes.  
Economic activities regarded as normal in market economies not only were prohibited under 
Soviet law, but also carried heavy penalties.  Private enterprise and commercial middleman 
activities carried a maximum penalty of 5 years in prison, while speculation drew a 7 year term.  
Bribery and theft of state property were punishable by 15 years’ imprisonment and death.  
Despite this stiff menu of punishments, these activities were commonplace, and indeed virtually 
necessary to maintain minimum living standards. 
   In fact, economic crimes were broadly tolerated by the Soviet regime.  They served to 
buffer the economy from the misallocation failures of the administrative system, and acted as a 
means of enforcing strict political control.  Tacit permission to engage in economic crimes 
served as a means to reward the nomenklatura and its clients, while the arbitrary threat of 
enforcing the law provided a means of maintaining strict control over political dissent.  
   Noncompliance with the rules was so pervasive that illegal activities comprised a vast 
underground economy known as the second economy.  Virtually every citizen was a de facto criminal by dint of engaging in one or more common economic crimes.  Citizens were reinforced 
in the expectation that no punishment would be exacted if one complied with the strict codes for 
appropriate political behavior.  These included informal conventions signaling the extent to 
which different levels of the political hierarchy could dip into the pot of forbidden economic 
riches.  Permitting a pervasive underground economy served as a means of controlling political 
dissention, rewarding elites, and buffering the hardships imposed by the inefficiencies of central 
planning.  The resulting regime of arbitrary discretion was the antithesis of the rule of law. 
 
The Rule of Law and the Regime of Arbitrary Discretion  
  Under the rule of law, conduct is governed by formal statutes and judicial agencies that 
offer and deliver access and equal protection to all citizens.  Institutional control is exercised by 
the even-handed application of formal rules.  The norm for behavior is compliance with the 
rules.  When the rules are violated, a credible system of effective punishment of violators comes 
into play.  Thus control is based on “the application of the law.”2 
  Under the Soviet regime of arbitrary discretion, most common conduct was prohibited by 
formal law, but enforced capriciously at the discretion of those in authority.   Access to the 
system’s institutional rewards and protections was reserved for the privileged few, but even then 
remained uncertain and uncontrolled by law.  The norm of behavior was noncompliance with the 
rules.   Penalties were assessed only rarely, and then only at the discretion or whim of the 
privileged elite that held effective power.  Control was based on infringement of the rules, and 
involved both the carrot and the stick.  The carrot consisted of granting the nomenklatura use 
rights over scare resources, whereas the stick consisted of the threat to exact punishment for the 
commission of economic crimes. 
 
                                                           
2 In describing the prereform Hungarian system Gabor (1989:347) distinguishes between “control based on the 
application of rules and “control based on the infringement of rules.” Implications of the Legacy of Noncompliance 
  The regime of arbitrary discretion was the legacy and operative institution that survived 
the collapse of communism.  Polishchuk (1997) ascribes some of the lack of progress in Russian 
reforms to the “institutional void” characterized by “missing markets.”  But the formal 
“institutional vacuum” was in fact filled with dominant informal rules that defined de facto 
property rights and incentives that guided resource allocation in the second economy.  Rent-
seeking, rent-creating and, rent-exploiting activities were pervasive.  
  In the transition period, policymakers hoped that “organic growth” would produce the 
political and economic institutions needed to support market activities, essentially leaving the 
market to create the market.  But this policy of benign neglect failed to produce the desired rule 
of law.  This was due not only to the lack of a broad constituency for building market-supporting 
institutions, but also to the inertia of the informal norms of noncompliance.  
  When reforms did occur, they often legitimated the system of noncompliance that was 
already in place.  World Bank (1996) estimates of unofficial activities suggest that in a sample of 
Central and Eastern European countries, the underground economy increased from 18 to 22 
percent between 1989 and 1994.  For a sample of NIS countries, the underground economy 
appeared to grow from 12 to 37 percent during the same period.  Increased noncompliance was 
associated with weakened political controls, higher tax rates, and incomplete liberalization.   
  Liberalization served to legitimate the pervasive black markets by legalizing speculation 
and arbitrage.  The freeing of prices conferred market value on many of the inventories 
accumulated as illegitimate wealth stocks under the Soviet regime.  The creation of internal and 
external ruble convertibility and the liberalization permitting the accumulation of co-circulating 
foreign currencies legitimated illegal stores of monetary wealth.  Thus the reforms simply 
legitimated much of the behavior that had already existed in the pre-transition period.  In this 
sphere, the revolution was less than revolutionary and proved to be highly path dependent.  
  Privatization legitimated the personal appropriation of state property by placing 
previously amorphous property rights to state assets directly in the hands of private actors.  Privatization created the opportunity for privileged elites with information and network 
advantages to convert limited de facto use and income rights into more valuable de jure alienable 
rights.  Not only did privatization legitimize de facto property rights, but it offered a huge 
incentive to allocate resources to protective and acquisitive activities.  The preference for 
predation over production was tied to the opportunity to capitalize long-term income streams by 
obtaining de jure alienation rights. 
  The uncertainty associated with tentative property rights also encourages appropriation of 
state property and discourages the type of productive investment that would normally be 
associated with longer economic horizons.  The expected rewards from rent-seeking activities 
simply dwarf the expected returns from productive activities.  Rent seeking will continue to 
dominate as long as there are valuable unassigned property rights in the public domain, still 
available for privatization.  
  The legacy of noncompliance inherited from the pre-transition period was accompanied 
by a pervasive distrust of government.  A history of policy reversals and arbitrary confiscations 
had destroyed the credibility of government pronouncements and policies.  Thus, the informal 
norm of distrusting government policy militates against every effort to establish the formal rule 
of law.  In the absence of effective state institutions that can protect and enforce newly created 
property rights, these rights will remain uncertain and their exercise will involve high transaction 
costs. 
   In this effectively stateless and lawless environment, organized crime can provide a 
locus of authority for contract enforcement and the adjudication of contested property rights.  
Thus, organized crime performs a substitute enforcement service that reduces uncertainty, albeit 
at a high social cost.  Unfortunately, the economies of scale that normally accrue to legitimate 
governmental institutions now accrue to the mafia.  Those public officials that retain the 
bureaucratic power to assign remaining public-domain property rights will continue to exploit 
their authority, reinforcing the legacy of corruption.   Although tax evasion existed in the pre-transition period, most taxes were collected 
implicitly by paying labor less than the value of its marginal product and by limiting the 
consumption of goods and services.  In market-oriented economies, resources are paid the value 
of their marginal product, and taxes are subsequently collected explicitly on resource earnings. 
When liberalization eliminated price controls for goods and factors, the implicit tax revenue 
collection mechanisms collapsed, and the state suffered a significant loss of revenue, which in 
turn bloated budget deficits.  These deficits could be financed either by creating money or by 
borrowing from the public.  Printing money to finance the deficit simply fueled inflation and 
compounded the disruptive effects of the transition.  It eroded the fixed incomes of the working 
poor and pensioners, and disguised the relative price signals of the fledgling market economy 
with shocks to the general price level.  
  The legacy of distrust of government also precluded the government from financing its 
deficit with the sale of public debt.  In desperation, the government embraced the same informal 
convention of nonpayment that had been adopted by large firms.  Nonpayment by firms created 
inter-industry arrears.  When the government refused to make payments for wages and pensions, 
it effectively forced an unwilling public to accept government debt in the form of government 
expenditure arrears. 
  Another legacy of the pre-reform system was a highly skewed distribution of wealth and 
information.  Although incomes were distributed quite equitably, differential access to state 
resources and selective opportunities for illegal wealth accumulation created a highly unequal 
distribution of de facto property rights.  The opportunity to convert and capitalize these de facto 
rights into de jure rights created a small but powerful constituency for selective privatization, but 
not necessarily one that would support generalized property rights. 
  Corruption is perhaps the most troubling legacy of the pre-transition period, and threatens 
the dynamic stability of the transition process.  Corruption occurs at the juncture were public and 
private sectors meet.  When public officials are granted authority to license, prohibit, tax, or 
subsidize economic activities, allocate favorable exchange rates, enforce trade restrictions or price controls, distribute valuable property rights and natural resource endowments--monopoly 
powers are created in the public domain.  Corruption is a form of government failure that occurs 
when public officials, acting as the agents of the state, exploit the state’s monopoly powers for 
their personal advantage.  Corruption involves noncompliance with the rules governing 
appropriate conduct in public office. 
   The extent of noncompliance will depend upon the expected gains and penalties which 
according to Klitgaard (1988) are determined by the monopoly power to be exploited, the extent 
of discretion granted the agent of the government and the degree to which the agent is held 
accountable.  The economic cost of corruption depends not only on its extent, but also on its 
nature.  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) present an industrial organization model of corruption that 
shows that corruption is less costly when it is controlled by an effective cartel, like the rule of 
arbitrary discretion imposed by the Communist party in the former Soviet Union.  In this case, 
payment of a bribe is sufficient to assure the predictable transfer of the scarce property right and 
the bribe price is kept in check.  The most costly form of corruption occurs when independent 
monopolists vie for bribes.  This model best describes the current situation in the NIS, were 
corruption is omnipresent, yet property right transfers remain uncertain and unpredictable even 
after bribes have been paid.  With vast, highly prized property rights in the public domain, 
controlled by independent monopolists whose actions are unconstrained by accountability and 
the rule of law, predation dominates production with devastating economic consequences. 
 
Building a Constituency for the Rule of Law 
  The legacy of noncompliance with formal rules and the concomitant distrust of public 
policy have resulted in great resistance to the necessary establishment of the rule of law to 
support and complement the still fragile property rights and market institutions of the 
transforming economies.  The earliest privatization schemes proposed to transition governments 
attempted to build a powerful constituency for reform institutions by creating a massive class of 
private shareholders (Feige, 1990b,1990c).  Privatization had to be demanded by the populace for there were no institutions to coerce citizen participation. It was hoped that the creation of a 
new egalitarian base of holders of residual property rights would produce a political lobby to 
establish and protect property rights as well as political pressures to improve corporate 
governance structures.  These structures, in turn, would maximize the value of the residual 
property rights themselves.  In addition to these incentive effects, it was hoped that the equitable 
distribution of valued assets would serve as a safety net to cushion the inevitable decline in other 
government support programs.   
  Polishchuk (1997) argues that this program failed in its first goal, “to prevent the rapid 
growth of inequality and to compensate for the loss of private savings to inflation,” while it is 
still unclear whether the program has helped to build a constituency to protect property rights.  In 
Russia, the scale of the privatization program was massive, creating a class of 50 million 
shareholders.3  Nevertheless, the failure to include “anti-carpetbagger” provisions (see Feige 
(1990b) to protect the residual property rights of the poorly informed public permitted wealth 
holdings to become even more highly skewed.  Russian enterprise insiders obtained, on average, 
two-thirds of the mass privatization shares. By 1996, “all employees owned an average of 58 
percent of the stock.” (Blasi, et. al (1997:54). Although a key objective of the privatization 
program was to break the dependency linkage between enterprise managers and politicians, “the 




                                                           
3 Nellis (1996) reports that by the end of 1994, the 15 transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
NIS privatized more than 30,000 large and medium-sized firms.  In Russia, 16,000 large and medium-sized firms 
and 75,000 small business were privatized.  However, an estimated 10,000 large and medium-sized firms are as yet 
not privatized. Blasi,et.al. (1997:26) report that by the beginning of 1996, “77.2 percent of mid-sized and large 
enterprises were privatized.”  Moreover, some 900,000 new small businesses were established representing 82 
percent of shops and retail stores employing 9 million people. Yet of 67 million employed Russians, “no more than 
27 million are in the private sector.”    The stubborn legacy of informal pre-transition norms and behaviors dominates the 
transition economies.  Those pre-transition economies whose formal and informal institutions 
were relatively coherent had less of a legacy of noncompliance to confound the transition 
adjustment.   But those economies in which the formal rules were largely observed in their 
breach inherited a profound legacy of noncompliance and distrust of government.  They are also 
characterized by acceptance of a wide range of protective and predatory behaviors that impose 
severe adjustment costs on the transformation process.   In this important sense, institutions 
matter, institutional change is highly path dependent, and it is less revolutionary than may appear 
at first blush.  
  Institutions do affect economic performance, but it is not always obvious which 
institutional rules dominate.  Where formal and informal institutions are coherent and consistent, 
the incentives produced by the formal rules will affect economic outcomes.  Under these 
circumstances, the rule of law typically secures property rights, reduces uncertainty, and lowers 
transaction costs.   In regimes of discretionary authority where formal institutions conflict with 
informal norms, noncompliance with the formal rules becomes pervasive, and underground 
economic activity is consequential for economic outcomes. 
    Many of the behaviors that violated the formal rules of pre-transition societies have now 
become legitimized in the transition period.   Legitimization has been accomplished by efforts to 
liberalize, privatize, and legalize.  Incomplete liberalization--the maintenance of arbitrary gaps 
between buy and sell prices--produces incentives for rent-seeking, acquisitive behaviors.  
Incomplete privatization--the maintenance of valuable assets in the public domain with 
amorphous property rights--produces incentives for predation.  Incomplete legalization--the 
maintenance of arbitrary discretion in place of the rule of law--sustains high levels of uncertainty 
and high transaction costs, and discourages the reallocation of resources to productive activities. 
  The formal rules in most of the former Soviet republics are still very far from being 
incentive compatible and many aspects of the old system persist unchanged.  Regulatory burdens 
and the number of regulatory agencies have ballooned, yet the legacy of noncompliance prevails and independent monopolists willfully exploit property rights that remain in the public domain.  
The tax authority is confiscatory, and organized crime extorts private taxes.  The wealth still 
open to rent-seeking is immense. In short, the incentive structure is such that protective and 
predatory behaviors tend to dominate productive behaviors with the result that lost production, 
corruption and a growing disparity in wealth threatens the success of the fragile process of 
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